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DUE PROCESS AND FEDERAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE




T HE forfeiture of property constitutes a significant and integral part of
the federal government's law enforcement effort. Generally, forfeitures
are intended either to penalize or deter the commission of crimes., Since
early stages of the nation's development, 2 the government has secured the
forfeiture of property used in the violation of various laws, including
smuggling undeclared goods, 3 transporting tax-unpaid liquor 4 trafficking
in narcotics,5 and violating wildlife conservation measures.6 The property
forfeited may vary from a vehicle or vessel used to facilitate the commis-
sion of a crime7 to a controlled substance 8 or personal property upon
© Copyright 1980 by Kenneth Kandaras. All rights reserved.
*B.S., Southern Illinois University; J.D., DePaul University Law School. Assistant
Professor, John Marshall Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of R. Scott Alsterda in the preparation of this Article.
I. "Forfeiture of conveyances that have been used-and may be used again-in viola-
tion of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes,
both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic pen-
alty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974); accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (the object of a forfeiture proceeding is to act as a penalty
for the commission of an offense and is quasi-criminal in character); Various Items v. United
States, 282 U.S. 568, 581 (1930) (the offense is attached to the distillery without regard to the
personal misconduct of the owner); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926) (the
forfeiture of property is a secondary defense against the commission of offenses and dis-
penses with the need to prove collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent
owner); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (the forfeiture of
property is fixed in this country's punitive and remedial jurisprudence).
2. Embargo Act, 2 Stat. 453 (1808).
3. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1594, 1595a (1976) (vessels and vehicles used to violate customs-reve-
nue laws).
4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7303 (1976) (property intended for use in violating the provisions
of the internal revenue laws).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3) (1976) (any containers or conveyances used to traffic in con-
trolled substances); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) (any vehicle, vessel, or craft used to transport
contraband narcotics, firearms, or counterfeit money). See generally Note, Operation of Fed-
eral Provisions Governing Forfeiture of Vehicles Used in Violating Federal Laws, 27 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 433 (1952).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1860(a) (1976) (Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976).
See generally Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977).
7. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) (automobile used to
conceal tax-unpaid liquor); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) (pirate ship);
United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (automo-
bile used to transport the seller of cocaine to and from bargaining sessions, although no
cocaine was transported in the automobile); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-
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which the tax has not been paid.9
Forfeitures are statutorily established and may be criminal or civil in
nature.' 0 In the case of civil forfeitures, the principal question is whether
the property was used in an unlawful manner. Normally, the property
owner's innocence is no defense to a civil forfeiture suit,"I because the
property's unlawful use rather than the property owner's criminal culpabil-
ity results in its forfeiture. This Article focuses on civil forfeiture statutes
and the procedural due process rights of a property owner whose property
has been seized and is threatened with forfeiture.
Forfeiture statutes generally provide that the government, upon proba-
ble cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture, may seize and
retain the property pending a judicial determination of its forfeiture.' 2
Significantly, the statutory procedure following the property's seizure does
not normally provide the owner an opportunity to challenge the propriety
of the government's seizure prior to a judicial forfeiture proceeding. Fur-
thermore, forfeiture statutes generally do not oblige the government to ini-
tiate judicial proceedings within a prescribed period of time. If the
government mistakenly seizes the property or unreasonably delays the
filing of the lawsuit, the property owner experiences a needless deprivation
of property. Ordinarily, the owner's sole statutory remedy is to await the
outcome of judicial forfeiture proceedings. The fact that most forfeiture
statutes fail to provide for the maintenance of post-seizure hearings and
lack specific temporal requirements for the initiation of judicial forfeiture
proceedings creates the potential for government abuse and implicates se-
rious questions of due process.
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.'3 the United States
Supreme Court held that a property owner is not entitled to a hearing
before the government seizes his property pursuant to forfeiture statutes.' 4
The thesis of this Article is that, consistent with the holding in Calero-
Toledo, the due process clause entitles the owner of property seized pursu-
ant to a forfeiture statute to an immediate post-seizure hearing to deter-
mine whether probable cause exists to believe the property is subject to
forfeiture. For illustration, and because many forfeiture statutes merely
incorporate customs law by reference,' 5 this Article makes liberal refer-
Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976) (automobile in which the driver was seated while
receiving payment for heroin).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1976) (heroin, marihuana, mescaline, etc.).
9. United States v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
(recovery sought of purportedly tax-unpaid jewelry), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. See Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Lastg?, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 768, 792-96 (1977). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) and United States v. Mandel,
408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976) with 26 U.S.C. § 5872 (1976) and McKeehan v. United
States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
11. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-86 (1974).
12. See notes 18-30 infra and accompanying text.
13. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
14. Id. at 679-80.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (applicable to the forfeiture of vessels, vehi-
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ence to the customs law. The Article's thesis, however, is applicable to any
forfeiture statute that does not provide an immediate post-seizure hearing
and that requires the owner to await the outcome of a judicial proceeding
for the return of his property. 16
I. PROCEDURE UNDER FORFEITURE STATUTES
A common feature in forfeiture statutes is the government's ability to
seize and retain the property pending the trial. Customs law, which allows
for the forfeiture of unlawfully imported goods and the vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft used to facilitate their importation, outlines a detailed procedure
for the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the property.17 Under the cus-
toms law, the government initiates a forfeiture by seizing the property in
any manner consistent with the fourth amendment.' 8 Therefore, property
may be seized if probable cause exists to believe that the property is subject
to forfeiture. 19 A customs officer must subsequently notify the owner and
all other persons with an interest in the property, either by publication 20 or
personal notice,2 1 of the property's seizure and the government's intent to
forfeit the property.
Customs reporting procedures are dependent upon the value of the
seized property. If the property's value exceeds $10,000, the officer must
promptly transmit to the United States attorney a report that must include
the results of the officer's investigation into the property's alleged unlawful
use.22 The United States attorney must then evaluate the case and initiate
judicial forfeiture proceedings if he determines the forfeiture claim is meri-
torious.23 If the property's value does not exceed $10,000, the customs of-
ficer and United States attorney are required to act only if the owner files a
cles, and aircraft used in bringing in and harboring illegal aliens); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1976)
(applicable to the forfeiture of containers or conveyances used to traffic in controlled sub-
stances); 22 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1976) (applicable to the forfeiture of any illegally exported war
material and the vessels, vehicles, or aircraft used to facilitate the exportation); 49 U.S.C.
§ 784 (1976) (applicable to the forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used to conceal or
transport contraband narcotics, firearms, or counterfeit money).
16. Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1625 (1976 & Supp. 111978) (procedure provided in the
customs law) with 26 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7325 (1976) (procedure provided for the forfeiture of
property used to violate internal revenue laws).
17. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1625 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). For a discussion of the problems of
fines and penalties under the customs law, see Dickey, Customs: Fines and Forfeitures Under
Section 592 of the TarifiAct of 1930-Revisited, 35 Bus. LAW. 149 (1979).
18. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova, 560 F.2d 464, 467-70 (Ist Cir. 1977).
19. Id. at 467-68.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. 11 1978) (notice by publication of government's seizure and
intent to forfeit property valued at less than $10,000). Notice by publication, however, may
violate the owner's right to due process if under the circumstances it is not reasonably calcu-
lated to provide actual notice of the impending forfeiture. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409
U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (per curiam) (involving a state forfeiture statute); Menkarell v. Bureau of
Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1972); Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993, 998-
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally Note, Forfeiture Proceedings-In Need of Due Process, 3
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 353-55 (1974-1975).
21. 19 C.F.R. § 162.31 (1979) (written notice to any individual who the facts of record
indicate has an interest in the seized property).
22. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1610 (Supp. 11 1978).
23. Id. § 1604 (1976).
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claim to the property and posts a bond sufficient to insure payment of the
government's court costs in the subsequent proceeding. 24 Property in this
latter category is summarily forfeited if the claim and bond are not timely
filed. 25
When judicial forfeiture proceedings are initiated, the action proceeds
like any civil claim. The parties are entitled to discovery and to a jury
trial,26 and no provision is made for expediting the trial. Pending trial, the
appropriate customs officer has the sole right to possess the property.27
Though he may return the property to any interested person, the officer
has the sole discretion to do S0.28 In the absence of a statute granting judi-
cial control over the return of property, courts usually lack authority to
enter an order restoring possession to the owner.29 Therefore, based solely
upon the seizing officer's belief that the property is subject to forfeiture, the
government maintains exclusive possession of the property from seizure to
trial. As a result, the owner may be deprived of his property for a substan-
tial time. The delay between the seizure and the filing of the suit, coupled
with the usual delay in bringing a case to trial, may be a matter of months,
or even more than a year.30
24. Id. §§ 1607 (Supp. 111978), 1608 (1976). The $10,000 threshold figure, contained in
§ 1607, is the result of a 1978 amendment that increased the figure from $2,500 to its present
level. Congressional history indicates that the increase was necessary to keep pace with the
rising value of automobiles and other merchandise. S. REP. No. 95-778, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2211, 2232.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976); see Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Jary Leasing Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). The summary forfeiture of property conditioned upon the property's value
and the owner's compliance with the bond requirement has raised serious due process ques-
tions. Imposing the bond requirement upon a person financially unable to comply deprives
the individual of his property without a hearing. Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir.
1976); Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976); see Note, supra note 20.
26. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943); United States v. One 1976 Mercedes
Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft,
436 F, Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
28. United States v. Heckinger, 163 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1947).
29. Id.; United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan, 73 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); cf.
United States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Greenburg, 334 F.
Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (district court entertaining related criminal case may not enter
pre-trial orders affecting property subject to civil forfeiture proceedings). Contra, United
States v. One 1975 Chevrolet Corvette Coupe, No. 77 C 1100 (N.D. Inl. Dec. 22, 1977) (dis-
trict court has authority to enter orders affecting property subsequent to initiation of judicial
forfeiture proceeding).
30. Courts have uniformly held that the due process clause requires the government to
commence the forfeiture proceeding within a reasonable period after the property's seizure.
See Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div., 530 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1976); States
Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Eight (8)
Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Considerable disagreement
exists, however, as to the remedy to be invoked if the government is guilty of unreasonable
delay. The majority of cases treat the government's delay as an affirmative defense that will
bar the forfeiture claim. See, e.g., United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F.
Supp. 193, 204 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The minority of cases conclude that the government is
liable for money damages occasioned by the delay, but leave the government's forfeiture
claim unabated. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div., 530 F.2d 672,
677 (5th Cir. 1976). See also In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
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II. DUE PROCESS-THE RIGHT TO A POST-SEIZURE HEARING
The government may not deprive an individual of his property except
by due process of law. 31 Compliance with this requirement necessitates a
two-pronged inquiry. First, one must determine whether the individual
has a protected interest in the property so as to entitle him to due process
of law.32 Secondly, if the individual has a sufficient interest in the prop-
erty, one must decide what process is due under the circumstances. 33
A. The Protected Interest
In forfeiture cases, whether a property owner has a protected interest in
property depends upon the nature of the property itself. Property subject
to forfeiture is classified as either derivative contraband or contraband per
se. The latter category is limited to "objects the possession of which, with-
out more, constitutes a crime. ' '34 The owner of property thus categorized
has no protected interest, and the government can seize and destroy the
property at will.35 Thus, illegally imported narcotics 36 or an unregistered
still and alcohol3 7 are deemed contraband per se and may be taken from
the owner without question. The opposite is true for property deemed de-
rivative contraband, property subject to forfeiture because of its illegal use
The following cases illustrate the actual delay experienced by an owner after seizure of his
property. Appropriate reference is made to those cases wherein the court held the delay
unconstitutional, and unless otherwise indicated the time reflects the period from the prop-
erty's seizure to commencement of judicial forfeiture proceedings. United States v. One
1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (11 months held unconstitutional); United
States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977) (5 months); United
States v. One 1972 Mercedes-Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1976) (1314 months from the
automobile's seizure to the close of the pleadings); United States v. One Motor Yacht
Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112 (ist Cir. 1975) (12 / months); United States v. One (1) 1972
Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (10 months); States Marine
Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (161h months from seizure of cargo from a
commercial vessel to claimant's suit seeking its return); Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d
468 (10th Cir.) (14 months held unconstitutional in seizure of jewelry), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930) (12 months from seizure of utensils
used in brewery to claimant's suit for return); United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone
Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (16 months held unconstitutional); United States
v. One (I) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (11 months held
unconstitutional); United States v. One (I) 1973 Ford LTD, 409 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1976)
(14 months); United States v. One (i) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel Winds Will, 405 F. Supp. 879
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (at least I 1 months), aff'd, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
One 1971 Volvo 2-Door Sedan, 393 F. Supp. 843 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (2 months); United States
v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (22 months held unconsti-
tutional), aff'd in part, iacated in part, and remanded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973) (20 months from the
automobile's seizure to trial); United States v. One 1971 Opel G. T., 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (13 / months held unconstitutional).
31. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
32. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
33. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332-35 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972).
34. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
35. Id. at 698-99.
36. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951).
37. United States v. Trupiano, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948).
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rather than its illegal nature. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania38 the Supreme Court stated that the owner of property, the pos-
session of which is not per se unlawful, has a sufficient interest in the
property to challenge the constitutionality of its seizure. 39 Although not
explicitly ruling on this point, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co. 40 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the sufficiency of the deriv-
ative contraband owner's interest by entertaining a yacht owner's claim
that a forfeiture statute violated his due process rights.
B. Due Process
The Supreme Court has recognized that in cases involving property dis-
putes the government can deprive a person of his property pending a full
and final adjudication of the controversy. 4' Thus, before a final adjudica-
tion the government may conclude that a welfare recipient no longer qual-
ifies for benefits and seek to terminate the payments upon notice and
opportunity for hearing. 42 Similarly, the government may come to the aid
of a secured creditor by deeming the debtor in default and allowing the
creditor to gain possession of the wrongfully detained secured property
before trial.4 3 Though the government has the power to deprive a person
of his property pending a final adjudication, such deprivation must com-
port with due process.44 The Mathews v. Eldridge45 decision provides a
framework for assessing the sufficiency of the process used to seize and
retain property.
In Mathews the Supreme Court held that the due process clause did not
require an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination
of social security disability benefits. 46 The Court's analysis indicated that
the government's decision to deprive a person of his property pending final
adjudication must be reached by a process that guards against an errone-
ous deprivation. 47 The sufficiency of the process was held to depend upon
three factors: the private interests affected; the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion in light of the probable value of alternative proceedings; and the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that alternative proceedings would entail.48 The
Court noted that no single procedure is mandated by the due process
clause49 and that only a pragmatic analysis of the existing procedure can
38. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
39. Id. at 701 n.1l.
40. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
41. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1969).
42. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
43. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
44. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
45. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
46. Id. at 349.
47. Id. at 334-35.
48. Id. at 335.
49. Id. at 334.
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determine whether the initial deprivation is triggered by a constitutionally
sufficient process. 50
In the area of forfeiture, the due process rights of a property owner have
been partially resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,5 ' which held that the owner of property
seized pursuant to a forfeiture statute is not entitled to a pre-seizure hear-
ing. 52 The property owner's argument that he was entitled to such a hear-
ing was premised upon the decision in Fuentes v. Shevin,53 which held that
in all but the most exceptional circumstances the government must give an
owner a hearing before his property is seized.5 4 The Court in Calero-To-
ledo held that the government's summary seizure of property in aid of
forfeiture statutes was within the Fuentes exception.5 5 First, the seizure
allowed the government to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the property in
order to conduct forfeiture proceedings.5 6 Secondly, the government was
justified in concluding that notice of the government's intent to seize the
property could prompt the property's concealment, removal, or destruc-
tion, thereby frustrating the forfeiture statute. 57 Thirdly, the initial deci-
sion to seize the property was made by a law enforcement officer pursuant
to a narrowly drawn statute, and therefore his judgment would likely
avoid a wholly unfounded seizure. 58
In Calero-Toledo, however, the only question considered by the Court
was whether Fuentes v. Shevin mandated a pre-seizure hearing.59 The
Court considered neither the general sufficiency of the statute's post-
seizure process nor the specific issue of whether the owner's interest in the
property and the risk of an erroneous seizure required an immediate post-
seizure hearing. An inquiry into the constitutional sufficiency of post-
seizure process requires an assessment of forfeiture statutes in light of the
factors enumerated in Mathews: (1) the private interests involved, (2) the
risk of an erroneous seizure in light of the probable value of a post-seizure
hearing, and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that alternative proceedings
would entail.
50. Id. at 339-49; see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1979).
51. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
52. Id. at 680.
53. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes the Supreme Court invalidated the prejudgment
replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania law because they failed to provide for pre-
seizure notice and hearing.
54. Id. at 82, 92-93. See generaly Note, Criminal Statutory Forfeitures and Puerto
Rico-A Re-Affirmation of the Old Order, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 184, 192 (1975).
55. 416 U.S. at 678-80.
56. Id. at 679.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 678.
1980]
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III. THE MATHEWS ANALYSIS
A. The Private Interest
The Mathews decision requires a qualitative assessment of the private
interest affected by the government's action. Viewed as related factors, an
increase in the property's significance spawns an increase in the rigor with
which the procedure must seek to avoid an erroneous seizure, and in turn
the law's willingness to reject statutory procedure in favor of a judicially
prescribed process. 60 In the past, the Court has attached great importance
to an individual's personal property, such as wages, 6' bank accounts, 62 and
consumer goods.63 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"the possible length of wrongful deprivation. . . is an important factor in
assessing the impact of official action on the private interests."64
Forfeiture statutes affect significant property rights. The property
seized, often automobiles and vessels, may represent a considerable invest-
ment. Though the owner may regain the property upon successfully de-
fending the action at trial, the delay in its return is often months, and
sometimes over a year.65 Deprived of the property, the owner may be
wholly unable to secure a substitute.66 In addition to the loss of use, the
owner may sustain an economic loss if the property depreciates in value
during the pendency of the trial.67 In light of the forms of property depri-
vations that presently require pretrial hearings, such as the garnishment of
wages68 or corporate bank accounts, 69 the revocation of a driver's li-
cense,70 or the temporary suspension from public school,71 the property
interest affected by forfeiture statutes is considerable. 72
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second factor in the Mathews analysis is the risk of erroneous depri-
vation created by the procedure. The risk of a mistaken seizure of prop-
erty under the existing procedure is substantial. Forfeiture statutes
60. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979).
61. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
62. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
63. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
By comparison, the Court has treated governmentally created property rights with less def-
erence than an individual's personal property rights. The process used to terminate the
rights in the former category is to some extent limited to that which the legislature has
provided. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (termination of federal disa-
bility benefits); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (termination of federal employ-
ment).
64. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
65. See note 30 supra.
66. Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. United States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1977).
68. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
69. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
70. Mackey v. Montym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). But see
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 431 (1977).
71. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
72. See generally Note, Mathews v. Eldridge Reviewed" A Fair Test on Balance, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1407, 1416-17 (1979).
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authorize the seizure of property based solely upon the officer's belief that
the property is contraband. 73 Consequently, the accuracy of the seizure
process depends upon the accuracy of both the officer's judgment and the
facts supporting that judgment. Without an assessment of the information
that the owner can provide, however, the officer's judgment necessarily re-
flects only a limited view of the facts.
In analogous situations the Supreme Court has recognized that the deci-
sion to deprive a person of his property pending the final adjudication of a
dispute should be made by an impartial decision-maker 74 and only after
the property owner has had an opportunity to introduce evidence in his
own behalf.75 The imposition of this requirement recognizes the need for
the owner's perspective, as well as the fact that the seizing officer, though
conscientious in his duties, is not always able to examine dispassionately
the evidence contrary to his original decision.76 The Mackey v. Monfrym77
decision illustrates the importance of the factfinding process in the avoid-
ance of an erroneous property deprivation. In Mackey the United States
Supreme Court stated that the risk of an erroneous decision is minimized
when the decision is based upon "objective facts either within the personal
knowledge of an impartial government official or readily ascertainable by
him."' 78 Though the Mackey decision considered the need for a hearing
before the government suspended an individual's driver's license, the
Court's analysis demonstrated the significance of objective facts in the de-
cision-making process. In Mackey a state statute provided for the immedi-
ate suspension of an individual's driver's license based solely upon the
arresting officer's report that the driver refused to undergo a required
breath-analysis examination. In discounting the need for a pre-suspension
hearing, the Court concluded that since the arresting officer would invaria-
bly witness the driver's refusal, there was little likelihood that the officer
would mistakenly trigger suspension of the license. 79 This fact, coupled
with the statute's provision for a prompt post-suspension hearing, satisfied
the driver's due process rights. 80
73. Forfeiture statutes may provide for the issuance of judicial process authorizing
seizure of the property but invariably, as an exception, allow for the property's seizure if the
seizure is reasonable under the fourth amendment. As the decision in United States v. One
1972 Chevrolet Nova, 560 F.2d 464, 469 (1st Cir. 1977), illustrates, property may be seized
without a warrant if there was a reasonable likelihood that property would be moved within
a short period after the discovery of probable cause. Id. at 467-68.
74. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
75. See generally North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See also Stypmann v.
City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977).
76. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
271 (1970). See also Simet, The Right to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing Under the Due Process
Clause-Constitutional Priorities and a Suggested Methodfor Making Decisions, I I CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1201, 1223 (1977-1978).
77. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 15. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974),
the Court noted several cases in which the government was not required to hold a hearing
attendant to the initial deprivation of property. The circumstances encompassed by these
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The facts supporting the seizure of property under forfeiture statutes
share none of the objectivity found in Mackey. Typically, property is sub-
ject to forfeiture if it is used to commit or facilitate the commission of a
particular offense.8 ' Unlike the limited situation examined in Mackey, law
enforcement officers do not invariably witness the property's unlawful use.
From a law enforcement perspective the violation of a forfeiture statute is
much like the commission of many criminal offenses; the offense may oc-
cur at a time and place far removed from the officer's personal view. In-
deed, property has been seized and forfeited based upon circumstantial
evidence of the property's unlawful use.8 2 Therefore, forfeiture statutes
cannot ensure that a law enforcement officer will have personal knowledge
of the property's unlawful use. An additional problem is posed by prop-
erty stolen from the owner or otherwise unlawfully used without his con-
sent. Property thus characterized is exempt from forfeiture. 83 The seizing
officer, however, may lack any factual basis to conclude that the property
was not stolen. Under either of the preceding circumstances, absent the
owner's perspective the seizing officer cannot form a well-informed and
balanced opinion. Without a procedure that requires consideration of the
cases reflect situations in which the government has an extraordinary need to act summarily
and in which its initial decision is likely correct, either being based upon documentary evi-
dence or a government officer's personal knowledge. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (to protect the public from misbranded drugs-documentary evi-
dence and government officer's personal knowledge); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (to aid the collection of tax revenues-documentary evidence); Coffin Bros. v. Ben-
nett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (to protect depositors from bank failure-documentary evidence);
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (to aid the war effort-government officer's
personal knowledge); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (to protect the public from putrid food-government officer's personal knowledge).
See generally Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 1,
5-20 (1972).
81. See notes 3-6 supra.
82. Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Bush v. United States, 389 F.2d 485
(5th Cir. 1968); Ted's Motors, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1954); United
States v. One 1971 Volvo 2-Door Sedan, 393 F. Supp. 843 (C.D. Cal. 1975); United States v.
A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
and remanded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1973 Volvo, 377 F. Supp.
810 (W.D. Tex. 1974); United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn.
1973).
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(B) (1976) (conveyances used to traffic in controlled sub-
stances); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) (vessels, vehicles, or aircraft used to transport contraband
narcotics, firearms, or counterfeit money). The Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co. stated:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitu-
tional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
taken from him without his privity or consent. . . . Similarly, the same might
be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and una-
ware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that
circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate
purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
416 U.S. at 689-90 (citations omitted); see United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury Auto.,




owner's facts and perspective, the government is free to ignore facts that
militate against the seizure of property.
If the process thus risks the mistaken seizure of property, the correlative
proposition is that a post-seizure hearing before an impartial decision-
maker could well avoid any possible error, or at least radically curtail any
period of wrongful deprivation. The Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell
v. W T Grant84 illustrates the value of such a hearing. In Mitchell the
Court upheld a state's sequestration of property upon the ex parte applica-
tion of the creditor, even though the debtor was not afforded notice and an
opportunity for a hearing prior to the sequestration. The Court based its
decision upon two propositions. First, the initial seizure of the property
was based upon the trial court's conclusion that the creditor, in an ex parte
hearing, had proved a right to the property and the need to seize the prop-
erty without prior notice to the debtor.8 5 Secondly, immediately after the
seizure the debtor was entitled to a hearing in which the creditor had the
burden of proving his right to possess the property pending the trial.86
The result in the Mitchell decision should be compared with the treat-
ment of forfeiture statutes in Calero-Toledo. In both situations the govern-
ment was justified 'in seizing a person's property without alerting the
owner. The facts in each decision reflect a process that attempted to avoid
an erroneous seizure. In Mitchell the seizure occurred pursuant to a judi-
cial order based upon the creditor's proof of his claim, and in Calero-To-
ledo an impartial law enforcement officer acted pursuant to a narrowly
drawn forfeiture statute. What is obviously lacking in the comparison,
however, is a corresponding post-seizure hearing in forfeiture statutes.
This glaring omission is justified by neither the type of facts involved nor
the nature of the parties' dispute.
In addition to reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation, a post-seizure
hearing might ameliorate the unfair negotiating position that forfeiture
statutes create. Customs law, for example, allows the government to com-
promise claims.8 7 The present system handicaps the individual because an
owner interested in the property's immediate return may forego his judi-
cial remedies and accept an offer of compromise. In Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp .8 8 the Court ruled unconstitutional a state law that permitted
a creditor to garnish the debtor's wages without prior notice and a hearing.
The Court, in part, based its decision upon the imbalance in the respective
negotiating positions and the likelihood that the debtor would accept an
unfair settlement offer and abandon his defense on the merits simply to
terminate the garnishment.8 9 Unfortunately, because forfeiture statutes do
not allow the owner to challenge the seizure before trial, they similarly
encourage the owner to abandon his defense rather than await the lengthy
84. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
85. Id. at 602.
86. Id. at 606-07, 609-10.
87. 19 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976).
88. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
89. Id. at 341.
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delay until trial. 90
C. The Fiscal and Administrative Burden
The type of post-seizure hearing eventually required may well resolve
the final factor in Mathews, the fiscal and administrative burden. A hear-
ing before an impartial and independent government officer need not pres-
ent an undue burden for the government. The hearing requirement could
simply demand that the owner be given adequate notice of the charges
against the property, as already set out in customs law,91 and of the facts to
be adduced at the hearing. At the hearing, the owner would be allowed to
be represented by counsel, to introduce evidence on his own behalf, and to
refute the evidence offered by the government. Similar requirements are
commonplace in a wide spectrum of government activities.
92
Beyond the relatively slight administrative and fiscal burden posed by
the hearing process itself, the requirement of an immediate post-seizure
hearing would not significantly affect the government's law enforcement
effort. The summary seizure of property, as the Court in Calero-Toledo
stated,93 is essential to the enforcement of forfeiture statutes. Once the
property is seized, however, no legitimate purpose is served by denying the
owner a hearing. If probable cause exists to believe the property is subject
to forfeiture, the government should have no difficulty proving that fact.
Without such proof the government would be remiss to retain the prop-
erty. The Constitution does not allow seizure and retention of property
without probable cause.94
IV. LEE V. THORNTON
Despite the need for an immediate post-seizure hearing, forfeiture litiga-
tion has failed to establish that such a hearing is constitutionally man-
dated. The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Lee v. Thornton,95 and
held that an owner is entitled to a post-seizure hearing, but unfortunately
conditioned the hearing upon the completion of a time-consuming and
problematic administrative procedure.96 An understanding of that proce-
dure is necessary to appreciate its significance in the case.
90. United States v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283, 288 (C.D. Cal.
1974), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977).
91. 19 C.F.R. § 162.31 (1979).
92. E.g., Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir.
1977) (seizure of vehicles from streets and highways); Kennedy v. Robb, 547 F.2d 408, 414-
15 (8th Cir. 1976) (continued state employment), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977); Atwater
v. Roudebush, 452 F. Supp. 622, 630-31 (N.D. I11. 1976) (withholding federal employee's
back wages and retirement benefits); Gonzales v. Calero, 440 F. Supp. 989, 998-99 (D.P.R.
1977) (continued government employment); Sockwell v. Maloney, 431 F. Supp. 1006, 1012-
13 (D. Conn. 1976) (continued receipt of foster care benefits), aff'dper curiam, 554 F.2d
1236 (2d Cir. 1977).
93. See text accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 33.
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Generally, forfeiture statutes allow the government, upon good cause,
either to impose a penalty short of the property's forfeiture or to return the
property outright.97 This procedure, referred to as mitigation and remis-
sion, allows the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to relieve the harsh-
ness of property forfeiture without judicial proceedings. The mitigation
and remission process operates upon the assumption that the property is
contraband and subject to forfeiture. While mitigation and remission af-
ford the government discretion to correct an unjust seizure, 98 the proce-
dure does not provide for an assessment of whether the government has
probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture. Instead,
mitigation and remission focus on the petitioner's innocence or some simi-
lar justification for avoidance of the forfeiture. 99
In Lee v. Thornton the court noted that forfeiture proceedings are time-
consuming consequently causing a serious deprivation of property.l°° Re-
lying on Mathews, the court held that the government was obliged to con-
vene a post-seizure hearing if the owner's petition for mitigation or
remission was not granted in full.' 0 ' Apparently as a means to expedite
the procedure, the court ruled that the government had to decide the peti-
tion within twenty-four hours of its submission.' 0 2 Thus, completion of
the mitigation and remission process was made a precondition to the post-
seizure hearing. Unfortunately, this requirement serves no valid purpose.
The mitigation and remission procedure represents a potentially time-
consuming activity. The owner's petition must state facts that justify the
government's forbearance.' 0 3 Thus, the owner must thoroughly investi-
gate the facts surrounding the seizure, and perhaps secure the advice of
counsel prior to submitting the petition. Federal regulations apparently
recognize the time involved-in investigation because they allow petitions to
be filed as late as sixty days from the date on which notice of the forfeiture
is mailed.'°4 If the petitioner requires additional time, an extension may
be granted.' 0 5 Thus, the filing of the petition for mitigation or remission
may occur long after the seizure. During this period of time, though the
government's seizure may be wholly erroneous, the owner loses the enjoy-
ment of his property.
The problem is compounded by requiring the government to determine
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 171.21 (1979).
98. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 n.27 (1974). See
generally Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy. A Proposalfor Reform, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 661, 671 (1978); Note, Forfeiture Remission: A Comparative Study of British,
Canadian and United States Policy, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 586 (1978).
99. 19 C.F.R. §§ 171.11, .13 (1979); see United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop
Auto., 207 F. Supp. 693, 699 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); cf. Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540
(Ct. Cl. 1974) (failure to file petition for remission or mitigation gives rise to inference that
the owner is guilty of wrongful conduct).
100. 538 F.2d at 32-33.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 19 C.F.R. § 171.11(c)(3) (1979).
104. Id. § 171.12(b).
105. Id. § 162.32(a).
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the merits of the petition within twenty-four hours of its submission. Each
petition seeks the government's forbearance on the grounds either that the
petitioner is innocent or that he is guilty only of some permissible ne-
glect.10 6 Both a determination of what the petitioner knew, or should have
known, about the property's use and an assessment of the petitioner's cred-
ibility are crucial to the government's decision. 0 7 In numerous cases the
government has argued that a reasonable investigation into the merits of a
petition may take weeks, or even months, depending upon the complexity
of the case. 108 The approach adopted in Lee makes no accommodation for
cases requiring even modest investigation. After a delay sufficient for the
owner to prepare the petition, the government is artificially constrained to
decide the merits of the petition almost immediately. Under these circum-
stances it is unreasonable to assume that the petition will be granted any-
thing but cursory treatment. 09
A potentially more vexing problem is the Lee decision's impact upon the
owner's constitutional right to a timely hearing on the merits of the prop-
erty's forfeiture. The government must initiate judicial forfeiture proceed-
ings within a reasonable period after the property is seized." I 0 In order to
avoid the effect of judicial decisions that required the government simulta-
neously to initiate judicial proceedings and entertain the owner's petition
for mitigation or remission, the customs regulations were amended."' l
The amendment provides that the petitioner be notified that upon the
filing of the petition he must file an express agreement to defer institution
of judicial proceedings until the completion of the petition procedure.," 2
As a result, the owner confronts a dilemma: he is given a post-seizure
hearing only if he waives his right to a timely judicial hearing, or he may
insist on a timely hearing and forego his right to a post-seizure hearing.
This unfortunate and probably unforeseen consequence of the Second Cir-
106. Id. §§ 171.13, .21.
107. United States v. One 1972 Mercedes-Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233, 1236 n.2 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 850 (1972); Jary Leasing Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
108. United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977)
(91/ months); Ivers v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (11 months);
United States v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (10 months),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
One 1971 Opel G.T., 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (10 months).
109. The prospect of a cursory examination of the petition is real. The general agree-
ment is that the government's disposition of the petition is not subject to judicial review.
Consequently, the government has unrestrained discretion to deny petitions for mitigation
or remission. United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); Jary Leasing Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y.
1966); Pullman Trust & Sav. Bank v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1964). Con-
tra, United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(government's failure to remit the vehicle violated the owner's due process rights). See gen-
erally Note, supra note 97, at 600.
110. See note 30 supra.
111. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,950, 31,954 (1979) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 162.31(2)(a)). Com-
pare Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) with United States v. One (1)
Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292, 1297-98 (S.D. Ga. 1977).
112. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,950, 31,956-57 (1979) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. § 162.31(2)(a)).
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cuit's decision militates strongly against future embracement of the Lee
approach.
V. CONCLUSION
An analysis of forfeiture procedure under the guidelines set forth in Ma-
thews demonstrates that due process demands that an owner of derivative
contraband be entitled to an immediate post-seizure hearing. The prop-
erty owner's interest in the possession of his property is substantial; the
fiscal and administrative burden on the government would be slight. Since
seizures are not based upon objective facts within the law enforcement of-
ficer's personal knowledge, the risk of erroneous deprivation is great. Al-
though the Supreme Court has decided that a pre-seizure hearing is not
mandatory because of the government's sizable interest in securing initial
possession and jurisdiction over potential contraband, once possession and
jurisdiction have been secured no legitimate justification remains for refus-
ing a preliminary hearing that might prevent an extended period of wrong-
ful deprivation. As illustrated by Mitchell v. WT Grant, an immediate
post-seizure hearing is the most acceptable means to accommodate the
government's need to seize property without notice with the owner's right
to avoid the mistaken seizure of his property.
Although the Second Circuit's decision in Lee v. Thornton recognized
the need for a post-seizure hearing, the approach adopted by that court
mistakenly delayed and conditioned the government's obligation to con-
vene such a hearing. Under the Lee approach, the property owner's right
to a post-seizure hearing is made contingent upon the unsuccessful petition
for mitigation and remission, a time-consuming procedure that may re-
quire the property owner to waive his right to a timely judicial forfeiture
proceeding. While the Lee decision is well-intentioned, the probable con-
sequences of the Second Circuit's unique resolution illustrate the need for
a post-seizure hearing that is both immediate and unconditional.
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